United Nations S/2018/1037

Security Council

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20 November 2018

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Identical letters dated 19 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to inform you of Lebanese violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), breaches of Israeli sovereignty and repeated crossings of the Blue Line during October 2018.

A comprehensive list of those violations is included in the annex to the present letter.

As outlined in the present letter, as well as in previous letters that I have sent, Lebanese violations of resolution 1701 (2006) occur daily. Yet despite their visibility and frequency, the vast majority of those violations are consistently excluded from the reports of the Secretariat.

I trust that forthcoming reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) will reflect the ongoing violations and the demand that the Lebanese Government abide by its commitment under the resolution.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-19897 (E) 261118

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Annex to the identical letters dated 19 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Lebanese violations as reported by the Israel Defense Forces, October 2018

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
1	1 October	1010	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
2	1 October	1132	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 10/1
3	1 October	1201	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
4	1 October	1238	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 42
5	1 October	1421	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 10
6	1 October	1435	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OGL SO 4
7	1 October	1534	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 66
8	1 October	1600	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 41
9	2 October	1054	Thirteen Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 31
10	2 October	1640	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 34 (1)
11	2 October	1650	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
12	2 October	1709	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 12/1
13	3 October	0703	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 64 (1)
14	3 October	0657	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 8
15	3 October	0847	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 65
16	3 October	0958	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 37
17	3 October	1039	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
18	3 October	1115	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
19	3 October	1451	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 37
20	3 October	1600	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
21	3 October	1609	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13 (2)
22	3 October	1814	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 8
23	4 October	0644	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of BP 38 (3)
24	4 October	0702	Four armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 8
25	4 October	0741	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 64 (1)
26	4 October	1011	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 15
27	4 October	1100	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 58
28	4 October	1230	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
29	4 October	1336	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 5 CHEB
30	4 October	1402	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 12
31	4 October	1547	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of BP 17
32	4 October	2118	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-31
33	5 October	0913	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 9
34	5 October	1102	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 13
35	6 October	0710	Five armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 48 (1)
36	6 October	0922	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3 A
37	6 October	1006	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 13
38	6 October	1007	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of BP 31(1)
39	6 October	1320	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3 A
40	6 October	1404	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
41	7 October	0829	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 68 (2)
42	7 October	0929	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 76 (1)
43	7 October	1045	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 10

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
44	7 October	1310	One person was observed throwing a bottle towards the TF in the vicinity of B 84
45	7 October	1319	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
46	7 October	1436	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
47	7 October	1518	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 4
48	7 October	1603	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP PROP
49	8 October	0943	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 5 (1)
50	8 October	1109	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of M 2 (1)
51	8 October	1440	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of UNP 6-50
52	8 October	1540	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 83 (1)
53	8 October	1539	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
54	8 October	1623	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
55	9 October	0744	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 8
56	9 October	0815	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of AOP 10
57	9 October	0914	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 23
58	9 October	0914	Two people were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of BP 23
59	9 October	0956	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
60	9 October	1113	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of M 6
61	9 October	1106	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
62	9 October	1301	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
63	9 October	1357	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 4
64	9 October	1415	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 383
65	9 October	1350	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
66	9 October	1312	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 38 (1)
67	9 October	1322	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 31

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
68	9 October	1558	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of AOP 10
69	9 October	1800	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 72 (1)
70	9 October	1800	Two people were observed throwing stones in the vicinity of B 72 (1)
71	10 October	0650	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 13
72	10 October	1218	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 72
73	10 October	1559	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13 (1)
74	11 October	0734	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of M 6 (1)
75	11 October	1124	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
76	11 October	1411	Five people were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
77	11 October	1710	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
78	12 October	0824	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of B 30 (1)
79	12 October	1115	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 78
80	12 October	1122	Two people were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3 A
81	12 October	1208	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
82	12 October	1443	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
83	12 October	1701	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
84	13 October	0832	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 75 (A)
85	13 October	1216	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of UNP 6-50
86	13 October	1728	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 63 (1)
87	13 October	1746	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13 (1)
88	13 October	1708	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 8
89	14 October	1215	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 66 (1)
90	14 October	1232	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
91	14 October	1422	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
92	14 October	1634	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of TP 37 (1)

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
93	14 October	1638	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 30
94	14 October	1747	Five men were observed throwing rocks at the TF in the vicinity of B 93 (1)
95	15 October	1215	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-7 C
96	15 October	1520	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 17
97	16 October	0650	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of OP 3
98	16 October	1216	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 5 CHEB
99	16 October	1238	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of OP 10
100	16 October	1524	One LAF soldier was observed pointing a weapon at Israel Defense Forces soldiers in the vicinity of B 85
101	17 October	1213	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
102	18 October	0810	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
103	18 October	1208	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 57
104	18 October	1316	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 3 (1)
105	18 October	1458	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 19 (1)
106	18 October	1700	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of OGL SO 3
107	18 October	1758	Eight Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 69 (1)
108	19 October	1025	Nine Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 69 (1)
109	19 October	1230	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 93
110	19 October	1123	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
111	19 October	1140	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 71 (2)
112	19 October	1604	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 74 (B)
113	19 October	1744	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 34
114	20 October	0753	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 66 (2)
115	20 October	1347	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 2
116	20 October	1654	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 67

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
117	21 October	0830	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of B 64
118	21 October	0841	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
119	21 October	0856	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
120	21 October	0957	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of M 8
121	21 October	1144	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP B 64 (1)
122	21 October	1225	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-31
123	21 October	1309	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of TP16
124	21 October	1321	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of BP 13 (2)
125	21 October	1612	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP B 45
126	22 October	0709	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP B 33
127	22 October	1052	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 2
128	22 October	0930	Eight Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 74 (B)
129	22 October	1146	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
130	22 October	1115	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 70
131	22 October	1336	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 4
132	22 October	1611	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP B 74
133	22 October	1317	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 25 (2)
134	23 October	0945	Five Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 52 (3)
135	23 October	1140	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 69 (1)
136	23 October	1447	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 72 (1)
137	23 October	1700	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of OGL SO 3
138	23 October	1620	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 23
139	24 October	1202	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 264 and climbing up the LAF tower
140	24 October	1235	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
141	24 October	1410	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33
142	25 October	0954	Seven Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 42
143	25 October	1025	Four Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 15
144	25 October	1159	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
145	25 October	1445	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
146	25 October	1715	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of M 6
147	26 October	1103	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 6 BAST
148	27 October	1240	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 42
149	27 October	1125	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
150	27 October	1310	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 12 (1)
151	27 October	1509	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 23
152	28 October	0911	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of BP 31
153	28 October	0932	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
154	28 October	1112	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP .1 (3)
155	28 October	1248	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3
156	28 October	1340	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3 A
157	28 October	1438	Two armed men were observed in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
158	29 October	0632	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 37 (1)
159	29 October	0704	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of BP 29 (1)
160	29 October	0826	Three armed men were observed in the vicinity of OP 1
161	29 October	0959	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of UNP 4-34
162	29 October	1107	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 5 (1)
163	29 October	1222	One person was observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of OP 3 A
164	29 October	1250	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of UNP 6-50

Number	*Date*	*Time*	*Description*
165	29 October	1355	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 33-B
166	29 October	1510	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
167	30 October	0856	One armed man was observed in the vicinity of AOP OLDHELI
168	30 October	0953	One Hizbullah militant was observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 13
169	30 October	1027	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 47 (1)
170	30 October	1022	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of BP 31
171	30 October	1226	Two persons were observed crossing the Blue Line in the vicinity of B 50
172	31 October	1053	Two Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of AP 263
173	31 October	1330	Six Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 94
174	31 October	1733	Three Hizbullah militants were observed performing a military recce in the vicinity of B 89 (1)

Abbreviations: AOP, alternate observation post; AP, additional point; B, barrel; BP, boundary pillar; LAF, Lebanese Armed Forces; M, point on the Blue Line (marked after 2000); OGL, Observer Group Lebanon; OP, observation post; recce, reconnaissance; TF, technical fence; TP, technical post; UNP, United Nations post.

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Letter dated 19 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 17–19 November 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-20032 (E) 261118 261118

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Annex to the letter dated 19 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (17 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Aleppo, two in Ladhiqiyah and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported three incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation over the past 24 hours: in Salihiyah, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, 450 food parcels with a total weight of 1.95 tons were delivered.

In total, 1,994 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,124.21 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (18 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Hama, three in Ladhiqiyah and two in Aleppo.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any violations.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation: in Khusham, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, 450 food parcels with a total weight of 1.95 tons were delivered.

In total, 1,995 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,126.16 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (19 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 10 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 6 in Aleppo, 2 in Idlib and 2 in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported 13 incidents of gunfire: 12 in Aleppo Governorate and 1 in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,995 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,126.16 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

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Letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I would like to reiterate the Government of Yemen's full support for the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen as the only means to achieving sustainable peace in Yemen, based on the three terms of reference, namely, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and implementation mechanism agreement, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2216 (2015).

Despite the continuous reluctance of the Houthi rebels, the Government of Yemen has been actively engaged with the United Nations-led efforts, including the most recent Geneva consultation in September 2018, which the Houthi rebels refused to attend. However, my Government still believes that the international community could apply more pressure on the Houthi rebels in order to achieve a breakthrough in the Yemeni peace process.

Furthermore, having had a close look at the new draft resolution prepared by the United Kingdom, and after a careful review of the text, I am afraid that the draft clearly undermines Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) and will negatively impact the United Nations-led peace process, in particular the forthcoming peace talks in Sweden. The Government underlines the importance of having any Security Council product support the United Nations-led peace process. Therefore, I am attaching hereto the position of the Government of Yemen regarding any intended Security Council product on Yemen (see annex).

I would much appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated to all the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Ahmed Awad **Binmubarak**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Position of the Government of Yemen regarding any intended Security Council resolution on Yemen

- Any new Security Council resolution should adhere to and mention clearly the three terms of reference that govern the United Nations-led peace process in Yemen: the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and implementation mechanism agreement, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 2216 (2015). The failure of a new resolution to stress the centrality of these references will undermine the United Nations-led peace process and perpetuate the current conflict in Yemen.

- Any new resolution should continue the Security Council's tradition of "Reaffirming its support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and reiterating its call to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and the legitimacy of the President of Yemen"; otherwise, it will be a wrong message to the Houthi rebels, encouraging them not to commit or interact with any upcoming peace talks organized by the Special Envoy for Yemen.

- Issuing a new Security Council resolution on Yemen, amid the current preparations for a new round of peace talks, will definitely impact the process and undermine the chances of its success, particularly if the document makes prejudgments of the peace talk outcomes.

- Any new Security Council resolution should condemn the repeated attacks carried out by the Houthi rebels against international maritime lanes in the southern Red Sea, including the random use of sea mines, which constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. Therefore, and in order to safeguard the international maritime lanes and to ensure the smooth passage of commercial ships, the international community should support the Yemeni Government in extending its control over all Yemeni territories, especially the western coastline that oversees the international maritime lane south of the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

- Any new Security Council resolution should draw attention to Iran's destructive involvement in the internal affairs of Yemen, such as its supplying the Houthi militia with arms, including ballistic missiles, and military experts. This has become an established fact, documented in the findings of the sanctions committee's Panel of Experts on Yemen, whose mandate is extended by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2402 (2018). The findings noted that Iran is in non-compliance with the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015), as well as resolution 2231 (2015).

- Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) sets the basis for the security arrangements of the peace process in Yemen, on which there is a consensus among the members of Council and international community. These security arrangements are the cornerstone to achieving sustainable peace in Yemen. Any attempt to overlook these security arrangements or place them after the political arrangements constitutes a violation of Security Council resolutions and would legitimize the presence of an armed militia possessing advanced military

capabilities in parallel to the State, thereby undermining the international law assertion of the State monopoly of military capabilities.

- Any demands for a ceasefire without a clear agreed implementing mechanism will only be wishful rhetoric and impractical, given that the Houthi rebels have violated all previous nine truces and have undermined all agreements and commitments, including the arrangements for Kuwait peace talks (Armistice Commission in Dhahran).

- It is important to underline that trust-building measures should be presented as one package in the upcoming talks to agree upon and implement, based on a timed and clear mechanism. As for the Central Bank of Yemen, it is important to show support for the measures taken by the Government to stabilize the currency exchange rate. The United Nations should call upon the international community to support the Central Bank, provide the necessary assistance to ensure depositing of the State's revenues from all over Yemen at the Central Bank. Furthermore, the United Nations should exercise pressure on the Houthi rebels to refrain from interfering and impeding the policies of the Central Bank and other commercial banks, most notably interventions by the Houthi leader, Adel Ahmed Khalil, who controls the monetary policies in Sana'a.

- The Government of Yemen carefully observes its obligations and commitments under international humanitarian Law and international human rights law. Meanwhile, the international community has the responsibility to exercise pressure on the Houthi militia to (a) ensure safe and expedited access to humanitarian assistance in all regions of Yemen; (b) refrain from targeting schools and health facilities or from using these civilian facilities for military purposes; (c) refrain from targeting civilians, exposing them to danger as a result of their extensive use of landmines in populated areas, and refrain from using civilians as human shields by preventing them from leaving conflict areas; and (d) stop recruiting children and sending them to the front lines.

- Any new Security Council resolution should underline that the United Nations mandate is clear and limited to ending the ongoing coup d'état and to restoring statehood legitimacy through a United Nations-led process between the Yemeni Government and the Houthi rebels. Any attempt to bring other parties to the negotiation table will definitely hinder the upcoming peace talks, rather legitimize the coup d'état and start another untimely national dialogue.

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Agenda item 45
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two documents detailing the violations of the national airspace of Cyprus and the infringements of international air traffic regulations in the Cyprus flight information region (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports and airports in Cyprus by Turkey (see annex II) during the month of September 2018.

This persistent policy of violating international law and breaching international rules and regulations is a constant threat to international peace and security, has a negative impact on regional stability, jeopardizes the safety of international civil aviation and creates difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus, and prevents the creation of an enabling environment in which to conduct the Cyprus peace process.

Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region via radio calls. During the month of September 2018, the regime installed by the occupying power in the area of Cyprus that it occupies illegally issued one notice to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force. Additionally, Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the airport of Tympou, which continues to operate illegally following the closure by the Cyprus Government of all ports of entry in the areas where it does not exercise effective control.

The said actions of Turkey, which has continued to occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining Cyprus' sovereignty, consolidating the ongoing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In this respect, I would like to underline that there is only one Cypriot State, which is the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions (in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)), in which the Council declared legally invalid the purported secession of part of Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of Cyprus by Turkey, as well as the

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infringements by the latter of international air traffic regulations, and appeal for their immediate cessation.

The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for all States to respect Security Council resolutions and adhere to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community to contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and promoting Cyprus' partition through the creation of facts on the ground and the consolidation of the status quo, including by seeking to politically upgrade the secessionist entity.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 45, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Polly **Ioannou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I to the letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 September	1110–1241	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
2 September	0810–0850	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 September	0740–0846	Four Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0745–0810	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 September	0952–1239	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1252–1317	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1828–1914	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
5 September	1237–1537	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
6 September	1001–1230	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1142–1252	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1320–1345	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1405–1604	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1710–1803	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 September	1105–1203	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1128–1148	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1714–1744	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 September	1049–1253	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1300–1542	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 September	0940–1243	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1520–1643	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1533–1629	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1554–1854	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1601–1617	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 September	1022–1200	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 September	1030–1239	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1105–1324	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1546–1858	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1920–2040	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 September	0100–0134	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1215–1418	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1640–1703	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 September	1026–1234	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1532–1700	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1557–1714	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1645–1809	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1806–2142	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1923–2017	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 September	1012–1223	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 September	0812–1050	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 September	1012–1242	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1433–1556	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1627–1712	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 September	1032–1145	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1228	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1410–1545	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1740–1834	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1851–1936	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 September	1000–1214	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
20 September	1004–1243	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1431–1636	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1415–1420	Two F-4 and two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1429–1434	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1440–1458	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1533–1546	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1715–1733	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1558–1820	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1923–1935	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2030–2148	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 September	1100–1305	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1345–1631	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 September	1428–1538	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 September	0839–1230	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1154–1332	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1500–1703	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1601–1840	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1844–2033	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
25 September	1021–1101	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 September	1018–1119	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1041–1100	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1053–1233	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1317–1450	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1650–1734	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1651–1710	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 September	1020–1120	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
28 September	1014–1237	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 20 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1–2 September	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6–8 September	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–15 September	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–16 September	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–17 September	One F-490 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
23–26 September	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
24–25 September	One A-1600 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
24–28 September	One A-1600 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
28 September	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

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Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017) and 2401 (2018)

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the fifty-seventh submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), paragraph 10 of resolution 2165 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2191 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2258 (2015), paragraph 5 of resolution 2332 (2016), paragraph 6 of resolution 2393 (2017) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2401 (2018), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The information contained herein is based on data available to agencies of the United Nations system and obtained from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and other relevant sources. Data from agencies of the United Nations system on their humanitarian deliveries have been reported for October 2018.

II. Major developments

Box 1
Key points: October 2018

1. Following a period of relative calm in the second half of September, October saw increased hostilities in several locations in and around Idlib Governorate in the north-west of the country. While air strikes were not reported in the area in October, numerous incidents of shelling involving Government forces and non-State armed opposition groups took place. Civilians in the north-west also continued to be impacted by hostilities and tensions involving non-State armed opposition groups and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (Levant Liberation Organization), and continued to face a range of protection threats.

2. Thousands of civilians were affected by an escalation of hostilities in south-eastern Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, where military operations against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continued in the Hajin enclave. Military operations

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continued to result in injury, death and displacement among the civilian population and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

3. Efforts to deploy an inter-agency aid convoy to the Rukban camp on the Syrian-Jordanian border, where up to 50,000 people faced an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, continued. A convoy planned for 27 October was postponed due to reported security threats. At least four children were reported to have died in the camp in October owing to a lack of access to adequate health care.

4. United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners continued to reach millions of people in need. From inside the country, the United Nations reached more than 2.63 million people with food assistance. No inter-agency humanitarian convoys were deployed in October and the bimonthly inter-agency convoy plan for September and October was not approved by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. However, United Nations agencies and humanitarian partners continued to reach people across the country through regular programming, including in several locations under Government control categorized as hard-to-reach. Cross-border assistance also remained an indispensable part of the response, with food assistance for some 583,000 people delivered by the United Nations from Turkey during October.

3. Since 24 February 2018, when the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities, military conflict has continued in parts of the Syrian Arab Republic. During the month of October, air strikes, artillery shelling or ground fighting were reported in the Governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama and Dayr al-Zawr.

4. Following a period of relative calm in the second half of September, October saw an increase in hostilities in several areas in Aleppo, Hama and Idlib Governorates in the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic. While air strikes remained suspended, numerous incidents of shelling involving Government forces and non-State armed opposition groups were reported, with some taking place inside the demilitarized zone established under the agreement announced by the Russian Federation and Turkey on 17 September, in Sochi, Russian Federation (see S/2018/852). Civilian casualties were reported both in areas under the control of the Government and in areas under the control of non-State armed opposition groups. Areas affected included Aleppo city, Mari' and I'zaz in rural Aleppo Governorate, parts of southern and south-eastern Idlib Governorate and several locations in north-western Hama Governorate. Civilian displacement was reported following clashes between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Levant Liberation Organization) and a non-State armed opposition group in and around Kafr Halab village in western rural Aleppo on 5 and 6 October, with some of the fighting taking place near a reception centre housing some 600 internally displaced people. Tensions between HTS and a non-State armed opposition group in Darat Izzah town on 26 September resulted in the closure of roads in the area.

5. A range of broader protection concerns persisted across the north-west of the country, including: kidnappings, several of which involved humanitarian and health-care workers; attacks involving improvised explosive devices; and other threats to civilians. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent reported that more than 1,600 internally displaced people returned to areas under Government control through the Abu al-Duhur crossing point between 23 and 29 October.

6. Thousands of civilians were impacted by an escalation of hostilities in south-eastern Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, where military operations against ISIL continued in the Hajin enclave. More than 10,000 civilians are estimated to remain in the enclave, where they faced growing needs and heavy movement restrictions. Women

and girls were reported to be most severely affected by a lack of basic services, including health care, water and sanitation. Living conditions for many of the 27,000 people estimated to have been displaced in the area since June also remained dire, with insecurity impeding efforts by humanitarian organizations to further scale up assistance, in particular in areas close to frontlines. Despite the challenges, assistance continued to be provided by United Nations partners in Kharayij and Bahrah during the reporting period.

7. Large numbers of civilian casualties due to air strikes were reported within the Hajin enclave, specifically in Hajin, Albu Badran and Susah towns, with women, children and Iraqi refugees among those killed. On 12 October, ISIL forces reportedly attacked a settlement of internally displaced persons in Hajin town. Subsequent satellite imagery indicated that more than half of the shelters at the site were destroyed. Satellite analysis also indicated that a total of 239 buildings appeared to have been damaged in Susah town between 10 September and 27 October, of which 54 were severely damaged and 90 were destroyed. Across Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, explosive hazards continued to pose a serious threat to civilians, with multiple injuries due to landmines and unexploded ordnance, of which several involved children.

8. Serious protection concerns relating to high levels of explosive hazard contamination also persisted in Raqqah city. An estimated 152,000 civilians have returned to the city since the end of major hostilities in October 2017, despite the risks. Humanitarian assistance in Raqqah has continued to be scaled up, through international and Syrian non-governmental organizations. During the reporting period, a mass grave containing more than 1,000 bodies was uncovered in Raqqah city.

9. The humanitarian situation of up to 50,000 people in the Rukban camp, on the Syrian-Jordanian border, continued to deteriorate during the reporting period. Food and other supplies became increasingly scarce. Health care remained a critical concern, with reports that at least four children died in the camp from 8 to 27 October of preventable conditions, owing to a lack of access to adequate health care. On 11 October, community leaders issued a public statement alleging constraints on the freedom of movement of displaced people in Rukban out of the camp, while several protests against conditions in the camp were also reported.

10. Following extensive discussions with representatives of the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, local communities and other interlocutors, agreement was reached that an inter-agency convoy would be deployed to the Rukban camp on 27 October to deliver aid and support the vaccination of children. However, on 26 October, it was deemed necessary to postpone the convoy owing to reported security threats. As at 31 October, discussions on the deployment of life-saving assistance to the area continued.

11. Internally displaced people continued to return to eastern Ghutah from sites in rural Damascus, which were reported to host just over 5,000 people as at late October. A large majority of the population remaining in the sites were men. The United Nations continued to provide food and other assistance at the sites and in eastern Ghutah itself, through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other partners. United Nations personnel continued to have limited access to eastern Ghutah.

12. Following concerns raised by humanitarian donors about charges being levied on empty vehicles travelling to pick up humanitarian supplies on the Syrian side of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Turkey and the north-west of the Syrian Arab Republic, and subsequent engagement by the United Nations with parties on the ground, on 1 October, the local administration in the area confirmed issuance of a waiver from road fees for all trucks supporting humanitarian deliveries. The so-called National Salvation Government issued a circular on 10 October prohibiting the

charging of fees against non-governmental organizations or transportation companies moving humanitarian commodities. No reports of such fees having continued were received following issuance of the circular.

13. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme (WFP) issued a special report[1] on 9 October, following a crop and food security assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic undertaken in June and July. The Mission reported a sharp decline in wheat production, with levels at their lowest since 1989 and around 30 per cent of the pre-conflict average of 4.1 million tonnes. The Mission estimated that 5.5 million Syrians remained in need of some form of food assistance. This figure did not include Idlib, where the Mission estimated that an additional 500,000 to 800,000 people may be food insecure.

14. Despite an escalation of hostilities in some locations in and around the so-called Idlib de-escalation area over the course of October, the 17 September memorandum between the Russian Federation and Turkey to establish a demilitarized zone in the area remained in place. In Istanbul on 27 October, the leaders of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Turkey jointly emphasized the importance of implementing confidence-building measures to contribute to the viability of the political process and a lasting ceasefire. The deadline of 15 October in the memorandum for the withdrawal of "radical terrorist groups" from the demilitarized zone was reportedly extended by the signatories.

15. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria continued his efforts to convene a United Nations-facilitated, constitutional committee in Geneva, in line with the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). The Special Envoy engaged with senior government officials in Damascus on 24 October, with the leaders of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Turkey at their summit in Istanbul on 27 October and with representatives of the "Small Group" comprising Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States in London on 29 October. During the meetings, the Special Envoy continued to emphasize that the United Nations would convene only a committee that was inclusive, credible and balanced. He also noted the convening role of the United Nations, as mandated by resolution 2254 (2015) and reaffirmed in the final statement of the Congress of the Syrian national dialogue, held in Sochi, Russian Federation, in January 2018 (S/2018/121).

Protection

16. Despite a relative decrease in the intensity of violence, civilians across the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be severely affected by the direct and indirect consequences of hostilities. Air and ground-based strikes continued to kill and injure civilians and damage and destroy civilian infrastructure. The number of civilian casualties and the scale of the destruction of civilian infrastructure remained a strong indication that the fundamental rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution and, in particular, of the prohibition on the launching of indiscriminate attacks may not have been respected.

17. Explosive weapons continued to be fired into populated areas, killing and injuring civilians and destroying and damaging vital infrastructure. Explosive hazard contamination in populated areas killed and injured civilians and impeded humanitarian access. The use of improvised explosive devices in some areas added to

[1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic* (2018), available at www.fao.org/in-action/kore/news-and-events/news-details/en/c/1156568/.

the complexity of the explosive hazard threat and continued to hinder the work of humanitarian actors.

18. In Idlib Governorate and surrounding areas in Hama and Aleppo Governorates, numerous incidents of shelling by Government and allied forces and non-State armed opposition groups seriously affected civilians and their well-being. Ground-based strikes on 26 October hit a number of villages, killing at least seven civilians and injuring at least five others.

19. Infighting between various non-State armed opposition groups in areas in Idlib and Aleppo Governorates continued to result in death and injury to civilians, including several children. Lawlessness and criminality that included threats, intimidation, kidnapping and killing continued to be reported in Idlib Governorate and other areas in the north-west under the control of non-State armed opposition groups. Civilians also continued to be killed and injured by air strikes and ground-based strikes launched against ISIL-held areas in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. In one incident, on 19 October, civilians were killed when a mosque was hit by air strikes.

20. In Suwayda' Governorate, ISIL continued to hold hostage civilians abducted from Shubayki village in the east of the Governorate in July. A second of the 27 hostages was reportedly executed on 1 October. On 19 October, ISIL released six hostages — two women and four children.

21. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to document numerous incidents of human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law committed by non-State armed opposition groups against civilians. Activists continued to be targeted and abducted for speaking out against abuses committed by various non-State armed opposition groups, while other civilians were abducted in order to extract ransoms. In one incident, the family of a head of a charity organization, originally abducted on 18 September, were sent pictures of him apparently being tortured after the family was unable to pay a ransom. Tens of men have been abducted since August, either for ransom or because of accusations of promoting reconciliation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The whereabouts and condition of many of these people remain unknown. In one incident, on 15 October, HTS fighters raided a village and reportedly abducted 12 civilian men from the same family. During the abduction, a 70-year-old man and his son were injured by gunfire, with the older man later dying of his injuries.

22. The United Nations received reports of multiple attacks on health-care personnel and facilities during the reporting period. On 10 October, the head of the Central Surgery Department of the Idlib Health Directorate was killed when an improvised explosive device detonated near his vehicle on the Kafraya road in Fu'ah, in central Idlib Governorate. On 31 October, the Health Directorate and a non-governmental organization announced the suspension of services in the Amal hospital in Huraytan, in northern rural Aleppo Governorate, for a three-day period, owing to repeated attacks on medical facilities in the area. In addition, the United Nations received reports of the detonation of an improvised explosive device under an ambulance parked near Basirah Hospital, in Dayr al-Zawr city. No casualties were reported in the incident.

23. Several verified reports were also received by the United Nations of attacks on schools and other interference with education during the reporting period. The Kurdish Self Administration in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic banned education through Arabic in more than 250 government schools from late September onwards. Some families were reported to have relocated or sent their children to other locations to ensure continued access to education through Arabic. From 8 October onwards, Kurdish Self Administration police at checkpoints prevented vehicles

transporting children to schools in areas controlled by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in Qamishli city from doing so.

24. On 24 October, a United Nations-supported school in Kafr Hamra in Aleppo was shelled. As the incident took place at night, no casualties were reported, but the resulting damage meant that the school remained closed for several days. On 21 October, Sana Al Rabis school in Idlib was impacted by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonation in a nearby neighbourhood. As the incident took place at night it resulted in material damage only. The United Nations also received reports of the alleged targeting of a primary school in Jarabulus district in Aleppo Governorate in an improvised explosive device attack. No casualties were reported.

Humanitarian access

Box 2
Key points

1. United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners continued to reach millions of people in need, including from within the Syrian Arab Republic. Humanitarian assistance provided from within the Syrian Arab Republic by United Nations agencies based in the country to regularly accessible locations in Government-controlled areas reached more than 2.63 million people with food assistance.

2. Although 1.16 million people remained in hard-to-reach areas, no inter-agency convoys have been approved since 16 August, and the September–October convoy plan was not approved by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period.

3. Cross-border assistance, authorized under Security Council resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2393 (2017), remained a vital part of the humanitarian response. In October, 375 trucks (14 consignments) delivered life-saving assistance to more than 1.3 million people through cross-border deliveries, including food assistance for some 583,000 people. United Nations humanitarian cross-border operations through Jordan remained suspended in October.

25. United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners reached millions of people in need, including women and children, through all available access routes, including (a) humanitarian operations from within the Syrian Arab Republic, whereby humanitarian deliveries reach those in need without crossing conflict lines; (b) cross-line convoys, whereby assistance from within the country is delivered across conflict lines; and (c) cross-border deliveries, whereby assistance is provided to those in need from neighbouring countries (see table 2). In addition to the United Nations and its partners, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and non-governmental organizations continued to deliver life-saving assistance to people in need. Local authorities in many areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups also continued to provide services where possible.

26. The Syrian authorities have stated that areas under the control of the Government should now be reached through regular programming modalities. At the same time, they have indicated that they would facilitate a greater number of missions and authorize increased deployment of United Nations personnel with convoys to these areas. The United Nations is ensuring that locations that have recently come under Government control are included in monthly regular programme requests, while maintaining that some hard-to-reach locations should continue to be targeted through the inter-agency convoy modality. On 31 October, the United Nations

submitted its plans for access via inter-agency convoys to six hard-to-reach locations in November and December, with a view to reaching 352,400 people in need in these areas.

27. Individual agencies continued to submit requests for single-agency deliveries to locations across the country. Such deliveries are undertaken by United Nations agencies based in Damascus to regularly accessible areas. In October, all 1,969 official requests submitted by WFP to the Syrian authorities to obtain facilitation letters for the transport of food assistance to locations across the country were approved. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) submitted 54 requests for facilitation letters for the movement of core relief items and livelihood kits, all of which were approved. UNHCR reached more than 2.8 million people with multisectoral support. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reached more than 1.1 million children and mothers with primary health-care and immunization services. In addition, an estimated 248,700 children and pregnant and lactating women were provided with complementary feeding and micronutrient supplementation. Some 171,600 children benefited from education supplies and services, school rehabilitation and textbooks, and 176,500 children benefited from protection and psychosocial support services. Nearly 290,000 people were reached with reproductive health and gender-based violence services supported by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and its partners. Approximately 3.2 million people received food assistance through both cross-border and regular deliveries, and around 805,500 people benefited from water, sanitation and hygiene services and supplies.

Table 1
People reached by the United Nations and other organizations through all modalities, October 2018

Organization	*Number of people reached*
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	[illegible]500
International Organization for Migration	37[illegible]000
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	2 825 000
United Nations Children's Fund	2 [illegible]00 000
United Nations Development Programme	1 [illegible]00 000
United Nations Population Fund	28[illegible] 400
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	17[illegible] 700
World Food Programme	3 20[illegible] 100
World Health Organization	86[illegible] 000

28. Cross-border deliveries continued under the terms of Security Council resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (see figure and table 2). In line with those resolutions, the United Nations notified the Syrian authorities in advance of each shipment, including its contents, its destination and the number of beneficiaries expected to be reached.

29. The United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic continued its operations as authorized under resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). During the reporting period, the Mechanism monitored the delivery of 14 consignments by seven United Nations agencies, consisting of 375 trucks, from three border crossings: eight from Bab al-Hawa (329 trucks), five from Bab al-Salam (42 trucks) and one from Ya'rubiyah (4 trucks). There were no concerns or questions about the humanitarian nature of the

consignments sent. The United Nations provided 48-hour notice to the Government regarding all shipments. Once in the country, United Nations partners ensured that shipments arrived at the designated warehouses. Independent third-party companies contracted by the United Nations ensured independent verification of the assistance arriving at the warehouses and monitored the distribution and/or service provision. The Mechanism continued to benefit from the excellent cooperation of the Governments of Iraq, Jordan and Turkey.

30. Since cross-border operations began in July 2014, following the adoption of resolution 2165 (2014), the United Nations has conducted more than 888 cross-border consignments, with more than 22,438 trucks (15,436 through Bab al-Hawa and 2,349 through Bab al-Salam from Turkey; 4,605 through Ramtha from Jordan; and 48 through Ya'rubiyah from Iraq). Those operations complement and support the aid provided by international and Syrian non-governmental organizations that provide services to millions more from neighbouring countries.

31. During the reporting period, humanitarian cross-border operations through Jordan remained suspended. However, WFP and its implementing partners delivered food assistance to some 583,000 people from the two authorized cross-border entry points with Turkey. The World Health Organization also conducted health and medical deliveries, providing treatment for more than 273,000 people through the cross-border mechanism. In the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic, UNICEF delivered winter kits, child protection assistance, nutrition, education, health and water, sanitation and hygiene supplies through a number of cross-border shipments. Around 211,000 health supplies were distributed, reaching over 1.8 million people. Over 16,000 children under the age of 5, as well as pregnant and lactating women, were reached with micronutrient supplies. More than 16,000 children under the age of 5, as well as pregnant and lactating women, were screened for acute malnutrition; of them, 374 severely malnourished children received appropriate treatment.

32. UNHCR and its partners continued to enhance the response to the protection needs of internally displaced persons, returnees and other crisis-affected populations. By the end of October, 1,516,810 individuals were reached through protection interventions, including 1,129,283 individuals reached with general protection activities, 226,127 individuals reached with child protection activities, and 161,400 individuals reached through awareness-raising campaigns on prevention and response activities relating to sexual and gender-based violence in 12 governorates. As at the end of October 2018, the total number of functioning UNHCR-funded community centres and mobile units stands at 97 community centres, 14 satellite centres and 92 mobile units, supported by 2,340 outreach volunteers. This network provided protection-related services, including community mobilization, child protection, legal aid, the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence, livelihood services and services for persons with specific needs, to benefit some 2.6 million internally displaced persons, returnees, members of host communities and other crisis-affected people across 12 Syrian governorates. As at October, 53,192 internally displaced persons in Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Suwayda', Dar'a, Qunaytirah, Tartus, Ladhiqiyah, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Hasakah and Dayr al-Zawr Governorates benefited from the UNHCR legal assistance programme, including some 2,000 internally displaced persons from eastern Ghutah (Rif Dimashq) and 581 from Afrin (Aleppo Governorate). Moreover, UNFPA reached more than 285,000 people, carrying out activities relating to reproductive health and the prevention of and response to gender-based violence and youth-related violence. Also during the reporting period, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) launched the third round of cash distributions. A total of 279,116 Palestine refugees each received $46. This third round of cash distributions is expected to be completed in early December. Owing to the financial crisis faced by

the Agency, the number of rounds of cash distribution has decreased to three rounds over 2018 as opposed to the six rounds planned in the UNRWA Emergency Appeal.

Figure

Number of beneficiaries assisted by the United Nations and its partners through cross-border humanitarian deliveries, by cluster, October 2018

(Thousands)



Table 2

Number of beneficiaries targeted through cross-border deliveries, by sector and by district, October 2018

Governorate	*District*	*Education*	*Food*	*Health*	*Non-food items shelter*	*Nutrition*	*Water, sanitation and hygiene*
Aleppo	I'zaz	–	78 635	83 750	4 500	–	–
Aleppo	Jabal Sim'an	–	247 880	35 910	6 600	–	–
Hasakah	Quamishli	–	–	53 733	1 200	–	–
Hama	Muhradah	–	–	–	–	–	–
Idlib	Ma'arrah	–	72 500	26 710	5 160	–	–
Idlib	Ariha	–	30 000	32 010	5 000	–	5 000
Idlib	Harim	–	95 255	1 085 942	17 152	–	–
Idlib	Idlib	–	58 385	44 620	10 000	–	10 000
Idlib	Jisr al-Shughur	–	–	1 500	–	–	–

33. The Russian Federation sent informational bulletins to the United Nations from the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, which outlined the provision of bilateral relief assistance. Other Member States also continued to provide bilateral and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

Visas and registrations

34. A total of 73 new United Nations visa requests were submitted to the Government in October. Of those, 43 were approved, 29 remained pending as at 31 October (it being noted that some were submitted late in the reporting period) and one was rejected. Of the 47 previously submitted visa applications that remained pending at the beginning of the reporting period, 42 were approved in October, 3 remained pending and 2 were rejected. A total of 83 United Nations visa renewal requests were submitted in October, of which 47 were approved and 36 remained pending as at 31 October (it being noted that some were submitted late in the reporting

period). Of the 50 previously submitted visa renewal requests that remained pending at the beginning of the reporting period, 48 were approved, 1 was rejected and 1 remained pending.

35. A total of 24 international non-governmental organizations are registered with the Government to operate in the country.

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and premises

36. Agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system continued to implement programmes in areas affected by frequent clashes among parties to the conflict, air strikes, the regular exchange of indirect artillery fire and asymmetrical attacks. As a result of activities relating to the armed conflict, significant populated areas became highly contaminated with unexploded ordnance, explosive remnants of war and landmines, which pose an elevated risk to the implementation of humanitarian activities in those areas.

37. Since the beginning of the conflict, dozens of humanitarian workers have been killed, including 22 staff members of the United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system, 18 of whom were staff members of UNRWA; 66 staff members and volunteers of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent; and 8 staff members and volunteers of the Palestine Red Crescent Society. Many staff members of international and national non-governmental organizations have also reportedly been killed.

38. A total of 28 staff members of agencies and programmes of the United Nations system (1 staff member of the United Nations Development Programme, 1 staff member of the United Nations Population Fund and 26 UNRWA staff members) were detained or missing as at the end of the reporting period.

III. Observations

39. I am alarmed by the increase in hostilities and their impact on civilians in the north-west of the country during the current reporting period, including in areas understood to lie within the demilitarized zone established under the 17 September agreement by the Russian Federation and Turkey. The lives and well-being of millions of civilians continue to depend on the parties' respect for the rules of war and on efforts to ensure de-escalation in Idlib and the surrounding areas. I urge all parties to redouble their efforts to avoid a military battle in Idlib, which would risk setting off a spiral of human suffering at a scale not yet seen in this terrible conflict, with potential implications across the region.

40. I am extremely concerned at reports of civilian casualties due to air strikes in eastern Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, where more than 10,000 people remain effectively trapped in areas controlled by ISIL.

41. I also condemn continued attacks and threats against civilians, as well as restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement, by ISIL, HTS and other non-State armed opposition groups in Dayr al-Zawr, Idlib and elsewhere. All parties to the conflict must respect international humanitarian law, including the fundamental duty to respect and protect civilians. Violations cannot be tolerated. Human rights must also be respected, protected and fulfilled.

42. I have frequently highlighted the importance of humanitarian access to the Rukban camp and am hopeful that discussions on further deployments of an aid convoy to the area, in addition to the convoy that delivered assistance in early November, will also lead to more sustained humanitarian support for people in this remote area. I reiterate that safe, rapid, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access

is critical, for people in need in Rukban and across the Syrian Arab Republic. Reports of the deaths of children in Rukban in recent weeks are an unacceptable result of limited humanitarian access.

43. In the north-west of the country, life-saving humanitarian aid has continued to be delivered across the Syrian-Turkish border, allowing humanitarian organizations to respond to current needs and to prepare for the continuing risk of a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Many people also continue to be reached in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic from Iraq with life-saving items that would not otherwise be available. The humanitarian nature of cross-border assistance continues to be verified by the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic, and its deliveries are confirmed on the ground by third-party monitors and through other means. The importance of the renewal of the modalities set out under resolution 2165 (2014) and subsequent resolutions, which support the provision of assistance to those in need through the most direct routes — including across borders — cannot be overstated at the current juncture. The United Nations does not have an alternative means of reaching people in need in these areas.

44. Continuing impunity for alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses by all parties to the conflict remains of grave concern. I call upon all parties to the conflict, all States, civil society and the United Nations system to cooperate fully with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, in particular by providing relevant information and documentation. I reiterate that accountability for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law is also central to achieving sustainable peace in the Syrian Arab Republic. I reiterate my call for the situation in the country to be referred to the International Criminal Court.

45. In view of serious ongoing concerns repeatedly raised by OHCHR with regard to the protection of civilians and other human rights issues in the Syrian Arab Republic, I continue to strongly urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, in line with Human Rights Council resolutions S-18/1 and 19/22, to cooperate with OHCHR, including through the establishment of a field presence with the mandate to protect and promote human rights.

46. I fully support my Special Envoy in his efforts to verify the feasibility of convening a credible constitutional committee that could provide a cornerstone for implementing the inclusive political process mandated by resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012. I count on all parties to support my Special Envoy as he pursues this effort. I reiterate that the goal of the United Nations is to end the suffering of the Syrian people and to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the conflict through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.

Annex

Reported incidents affecting civilians recorded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, October 2018*

Suwayda' Governorate

- On 1 October, ISIL reportedly executed a second hostage from among the 27 civilians abducted from Shubayki village in eastern Suwayda' Governorate on 25 July. Video footage circulated on social media on 2 October, depicting two members of ISIL shooting and killing a woman believed to be the hostage from Shubayki. Local sources confirmed the execution and identity of the woman. The execution was reportedly in retaliation for the ongoing Government offensive against ISIL positions in the area of Tulul al-Safa, east of Suwayda'.
- On 19 October, ISIL released six hostages — two women and four children — reportedly in exchange for the release of 17 ISIL women who were in the custody of the Government.

Aleppo Governorate

- On 5 October, heavy clashes took place in the early morning in the village of Kafr Halab in Atarib district in south-west Aleppo Governorate, killing a girl and injuring a boy from the same family in their home. The same day, HTS opened fire on civilians protesting the killing of the two siblings, killing one protester and leaving seven others injured.
- On 19 October, a male civilian was reportedly killed and at least 10 others, including children, were injured as a result of what were alleged to be ground-based strikes on several neighbourhoods in Government-controlled Aleppo city, including Zahra', Halab al-Jadidah and Sabil neighbourhoods.
- On 22 October, four male civilians were reportedly injured as a result of ground-based strikes on opposition-controlled Bab city, in north-east Aleppo city.
- On 23 October, at least seven civilians were injured as a result of what were alleged to be ground-based strikes on A'zamiyah, Akramiyah and Sayf al-Dawlah neighbourhoods in Government-controlled areas of Aleppo city.
- On 24 October, a five-year old girl was killed and at least three other civilians injured in opposition-controlled Kafr Hamra in western rural Aleppo, as a result of alleged ground-based strikes.

Idlib Governorate

- On 1 October, a civilian man was injured by what was reported to be a roadside improvised explosive device that detonated in Saraqib city, in eastern Idlib Governorate. The device was reported to have targeted a local HTS leader.

* In line with Security Council resolution 2258 (2015), the present description of incidents that are reported to have occurred during the month relates to compliance with Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. The information is provided without prejudice to the work of the Task Force on the Cessation of Hostilities of the International Syria Support Group. The list of incidents gives examples of human rights issues of concern raised in the report. However, owing to the changing patterns of conflict and the loss of networks of credible and/or reliable sources in many conflict-affected areas, verifying incidents is increasingly difficult. The list contains only those incidents that were reported to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and have been verified according to its methodology, and should not be considered comprehensive.

- On 2 October, HTS fighters raided the homes of two activists from Kansafrah in Ariha district, in rural eastern Idlib Governorate, and detained them. Sources on the ground reported that the activists were detained for their active role in organizing demonstrations and for being critical of HTS. One of them was released on 9 October. The whereabouts of the second remain unknown.

- On 10 October, a civilian man was killed and two others were injured after Ahrar al-Sham fighters raided a house in Tah town in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man district, Idlib Governorate. They were reportedly looking for a man alleged to be collaborating with the Government forces.

- On 11 October, an activist was detained by HTS fighters in Idlib city following a series of posts on social media criticizing restrictive measures imposed by the "Salvation Government" as well as HTS targeting of activists. The activist was released the same day after signing a paper committing him to refrain from spreading "false accusations" against HTS.

- On 12 October, an activist working with a local non-governmental organization in the village of Atimah, in, northern rural Idlib Governorate, was abducted by armed men believed to belong to HTS while on his way to a mosque. The organization reportedly decided to suspend its activities in Atimah until he is released. His whereabouts remain unknown.

- On 13 October, unidentified masked armed men reportedly abducted a civilian man at the gate of his house in the centre of Idlib city. The abductee was released on 15 October, reportedly in exchange for a ransom.

- On 13 October, an unknown armed group claiming to be part of HTS security reportedly raided a shop in Thabit neighbourhood in Idlib city and abducted its owner. The whereabouts of the abductee remain unknown.

- On 15 October, a group of HTS fighters raided Ayn al-Arus village in Ariha district, west of Jabal al-Zawiyah, and reportedly detained 12 civilian men, all from the same family. During the raid, the HTS fighters reportedly fired gunshots, injuring two of those detained — a 70-year-old man working as a farmer, as well as his son. The older man died as a result of his wounds shortly after the raid and his body was then returned to the family. His wife was also injured when she was hit by one of the fighters.

- On 21 October, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device exploded in the vicinity of the Rawdah Mosque in Qusur neighbourhood in Idlib city, reportedly killing three civilians, including an 8-year-old child, and injuring 13 others, including one woman. The explosion occurred near a mosque in a heavily populated area and caused significant structural damage around the area, including to some shops and residential buildings.

- On 21 October, the head of a Syrian charity abducted by unknown armed male fighters in Sahyan village, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, on 18 September (previously reported), was released. The kidnappers had demanded a ransom from his family. The circumstances surrounding his release remain unknown.

- On 23 October, 2 civilian men were killed and 10 others were injured as a result of armed clashes which broke out between HTS and the National Liberation Front around the village of Jarjanaz, east of the town of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, in southern Idlib Governorate.

- On 26 October, Government forces and their allies resumed ground-based strikes on villages across Idlib. Seven civilians were reportedly killed in the strikes and at least five others injured. The strikes mainly affected the village of Ruffah, in eastern rural Idlib, where six civilians, three children, two women

and one man, were killed, and the village of Bdama, in Jisr al-Shughur, western Idlib, where one civilian man was killed.

Homs Governorate

- On 6 October, a 58-year-old woman, internally displaced from Tadmur (Palmyra), reportedly died in the Rukban camp near the Syrian-Jordanian border owing to a lack of access to adequate health care.
- On 8 October, a 16-month-old boy from Qaryatayn in Homs died in the Rukban camp as a result of complications caused by severe malnutrition.
- On 27 October, an eight-month-old boy in the Rukban camp suffering from hepatitis A died after his medical condition deteriorated.

Dayr al-Zawr Governorate

- On 19 October, the Othman Ibn Affan mosque (previously called the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq mosque) in Albu Badran village in Susah town, eastern rural Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, was allegedly hit with what were reported to be airstrikes, resulting in dozens of casualties. According to interviews conducted by OHCHR, the airstrikes hit the mosque after the sunset (Maghrib) prayer, reportedly killing dozens of people, including a number of men believed to be ISIL affiliates. OHCHR was able to obtain the names of six civilians, including two women who were reportedly killed while walking in close proximity to the mosque. OHCHR is not currently in a position to confirm the total number of civilians killed in these air strikes and whether or not the rest of reported casualties were affiliates of ISIL. OHCHR continues to gather information concerning the airstrikes on Albu Badranand other parts of Susah town.
- On 19 October, ground-based strikes hit Susah town, reportedly injuring three civilians.
- On 21 October, airstrikes hit a house in Susah town where ISIL fighters were allegedly present, reportedly resulting in the killing of five civilians, four (including two women) who lived in a nearby house, and another woman who was reportedly passing by on the street with her child. The woman's child was injured.

United Nations S/2018/1042

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary General on trafficking in persons in armed conflict pursuant to Security Council resolution 2388 (2017)

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2388 (2017), the Security Council reiterated its deep concern that, despite its condemnation of acts of trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict, such acts continued to occur. The Council also expressed grave concern over the high number of women and children subjected to trafficking in areas affected by armed conflict and the abduction of children in conflict situations. In the resolution, the Council called upon Member States to, among other things, improve their implementation of applicable legal obligations to criminalize, prevent and otherwise combat trafficking in persons and to step up their efforts to investigate, disrupt and dismantle networks engaging in trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict. The Council also called on Member States to combat related crimes, such as money-laundering, corruption, the smuggling of migrants and other forms of organized crime and encouraged relevant United Nations agencies and entities to develop, in accordance with their mandates, their capability to assess and respond to situations of trafficking in persons in armed conflict.

2. The present report follows up on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2388 (2017) and on the progress made in the past 12 months. It is based on information provided by Member States, United Nations entities and relevant international and regional bodies.

II. Recent developments concerning trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict

3. Since the debate at the Security Council on trafficking in persons that was held on 21 November 2017, the severity of human trafficking in conflict and post-conflict situations, as well as the nexus between terrorism and trafficking in persons, has been examined on a number of occasions by the Council. The issue was discussed during several Security Council debates, including the debate on the maintenance of international peace and security held on 28 November 2017 (see S/PV.8114) and the debate on children and armed conflict held on 9 July 2018 (see S/PV.8305). I have also recently reported on instances of conflict-related sexual violence that encompass trafficking in persons when committed in situations of conflict for the purpose of sexual violence or exploitation (see S/2018/250).

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Overview and state of play of trafficking acts carried out by armed groups

4. Trafficking in persons continues to be increasingly identified as a feature of armed conflict. The cycles of violence that animate conflict often enable abuse, exploitation and crime to thrive, providing the base conditions under which trafficking in persons can flourish. Instances of forced marriage, sexual slavery and forced prostitution, which have long been a feature of many conflict situations, may at the same time qualify as forms of trafficking in persons.

5. The severe acts of trafficking in persons occurring in Libya against migrants, discussed by the Security Council on 28 November 2017, raised public awareness of the risks facing people on the move. In my report on making migration work for all (A/72/643), I underlined the risks and vulnerability of persons fleeing conflicts or on the move, especially those travelling through territories marked by insecurity and fragility. Political fragmentation and the proliferation of arms and armed groups in Libya have allowed trafficking networks to thrive and perpetrate sexual violence against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (see S/2018/250). In my report of 12 February 2018 (S/2018/140), I encouraged the Libyan authorities to spare no effort to identify and prosecute those responsible for such heinous crimes, and called on all actors to cooperate with and support the efforts of the Libyan authorities to bring perpetrators to justice.

6. A task force on the situation of stranded migrants in Libya was formally launched in December 2017 by the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations, who agreed to coordinate positions to promote African, European and international initiatives aimed at reducing demand, disrupting the supply chain and bringing migrant smugglers and human traffickers to justice. As at August 2018, the task force had facilitated 26,000 voluntary humanitarian returns through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the evacuation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of 1,600 persons in need of international protection.

7. Boko Haram continues to abduct young girls for exploitative purposes.[1] In addition, the growing use of young women and girls as suicide bombers has created an atmosphere of suspicion towards them and made them targets of harassment, stigmatization and arbitrary arrest by security forces, raising concerns about the reintegration of surrendered Boko Haram fighters (see S/2018/521).

8. Similar patterns have also been detected in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab, for instance, abducted over 1,600 children from January to December 2017, which points to a sustained reliance on children for combat and support duties (see A/72/865–S/2018/465). Women and girls are also reportedly trafficked by Al-Shabaab from the coastal regions of Kenya to Somalia, where they are forced into sexual slavery, after being deceived by false promises of work abroad. Some of those women were reportedly held as sex slaves, while others were forced to become the "wives" of insurgents (see S/2018/250).

9. The activities of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Daesh) also continue to raise grave concern, despite its decline on the ground. Thousands of Iraqi Yazidi women and girls, captured since August 2014, continued in 2018 to be trafficked into and across the Syrian Arab Republic — some forcibly transferred — where they have been used as sex slaves as part of the ongoing campaign of ISIL of targeting members of minority groups. In this context, I particularly welcome the award of the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize to Nadia Murad, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Goodwill Ambassador for the

[1] See Security Council press statement of 2 March 2018. Available at www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13233.doc.htm.

Dignity of Survivors of Human Trafficking, herself a member of the Yazidi community and survivor of human trafficking in conflict situations.

10. The Security Council, in its resolutions 2331 (2016) and 2388 (2017), underscored that certain acts or offences associated with trafficking in the context of armed conflict might constitute war crimes. At the same time, effective prosecution of offenders requires the collection of solid and reliable evidence during the investigation, which presents serious challenges in areas where armed and terrorist groups operate. In order to respond, at least in part, to such situations and pursuant to Security Council resolution 2379 (2017), I appointed in May 2018 a Special Adviser and head of an investigative team to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL accountable by collecting, preserving and storing evidence in Iraq of acts committed by this terrorist group that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I call upon all States to fully support and cooperate with the investigative team. I also welcome the ongoing work of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.

11. In Myanmar, reports have indicated that Rohingya women and girls who fled violence from Rakhine State to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, confront risks of trafficking, in addition to forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Women and girls in the Kachin and northern Shan states of Myanmar also face serious risks of trafficking and sexual slavery (see S/2018/250). According to testimonial evidence collected by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, rape and other forms of sexual violence were perpetrated on a massive scale and formed part of a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorize or punish a civilian population (see A/HRC/39/64).

Linkages between trafficking and grave violations against children affected by armed conflict

12. Armed conflict has an impact on the lives of children and makes them vulnerable to trafficking in persons and other forms of exploitation. Trafficking in persons is closely linked to the six grave violations affecting children in situations of armed conflict. In this context, the recruitment and use of children nearly always constitutes trafficking, as the two required elements of the offence of trafficking in persons that affect children, namely the action (recruitment) and purpose (exploitation), are intrinsic elements of this grave violation. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are also clearly linked to trafficking, as armed groups often traffic children for sexual purposes and sometimes to financially sustain their activities. Abduction can also amount to trafficking when it occurs for exploitative purposes, as is often the case in conflict situations. The Security Council, in its resolution 2427 (2018), recognized the links between abductions, recruitment and trafficking in persons and encouraged relevant parts of the United Nations System, within their respective mandates, to work to address this issue.

13. While these grave violations have a clear and direct link to trafficking in persons, other grave violations are linked in less intuitive ways. For example, attacks on schools and hospitals can be used to abduct children, but these violations can also make children more vulnerable to additional abuses and violations. Destroying schools and hospitals and preventing educational opportunities leaves children more vulnerable to trafficking, as they will be forced to seek education, care or even employment elsewhere. Moreover, the denial of humanitarian access may also leave children more vulnerable to trafficking as they are forced to find ways to leave areas where insufficient aid is getting through.

14. In the past 12 months, I have submitted to the Security Council country-specific reports on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2018/502), Mali (S/2018/136) and Myanmar (S/2017/1099), all of which addressed acts closely linked to human trafficking, such as the abduction of children.

15. In my report on children and armed conflict of May 2018 (A/72/865–S/2018/465), I noted that the United Nations continued to document the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, including three verified cases of boys recruited by ISIL in and around Tripoli for trafficking into the Syrian Arab Republic.[2] In its 2018 report (S/2018/594), the Panel of Experts on Yemen reported investigations of individuals and networks engaging in child recruitment and the use of children in conflict. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups and community defence groups engaged in the forced recruitment and use of children, exposing them to other grave violations, including sexual violence. At least 56 per cent of the newly recruited girls reported rape, sexual slavery or forced marriage by armed groups (see S/2018/502).

Arrest and detention of persons released from the captivity of armed groups

16. Identification of victims of trafficking is essential to ensure that they receive protection and assistance in accordance with applicable international legal instruments and domestic legislation. Routinely assessing the individual situation of persons, including children, released from the captivity of armed and terrorist groups facilitates an active determination of whether they have been trafficked. Such assessments also facilitate, in line with domestic legislation, non-prosecution or punishment of victims of trafficking for unlawful activities they may have committed as a direct result of having been subjected to trafficking.

17. Recent country-specific reports on children and armed conflict note instances of children being arrested and detained for their alleged association with armed groups. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at least 95 children were detained on such grounds for periods ranging between 30 days and one year. Children reported poor detention conditions and, in some cases, inhumane treatment, including torture (see S/2018/502). In Mali, 72 boys who were arrested and detained by the Government for their alleged association with armed groups were released, but other children remain in custody (see S/2018/136).

18. Women and children formerly associated with violent extremist groups are often seen by societies as "affiliates" rather than victims, and, in some cases, actions by the authorities have reinforced those views. Local-level officials in Iraq have reportedly designated children as "ISIL terrorists" on their birth certificates. Women and girls forcibly married to ISIL fighters often face a presumption of "guilt by association". In some cases, women and girls have been held arbitrarily, without judicial review following their release from ISIL captivity (see (S/2018/250). As at July 2018, over 1,300 children were reportedly being held by parties in the north-eastern part of the Syrian Arab Republic. Of those reported cases, the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), could verify only seven cases since the beginning of 2018, owing to a lack of access (see A/73/278 and S/PV.8320).

[2] In the Syrian Arab Republic itself, from January to December 2017, the United Nations verified 24 cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence (23 girls and 1 boy). Cases included gang rape, forced marriage to armed group fighters, trafficking and sexual enslavement. Of the 24 cases, 18 were attributed to ISIL, 4 to Government forces and 2 to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. I have expressed concern over reports of trafficking of children in Libya.

Other developments

19. In the follow-up to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,[3] Member States negotiated the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The non-binding but intergovernmentally negotiated and agreed outcome was published on 13 July 2018.[4] In that document, Member States commit to take legislative or other measures to prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration. I welcome this commitment, which is essential to addressing the risks of human rights violations and abuse faced by refugees and migrants, especially female migrants and separated and/or unaccompanied children.

20. The Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, has stressed how Somali and Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers fleeing conflict have been kidnapped or lured from refugee camps or while travelling, sold and subsequently held captive in Libya or in the Sinai desert for the purpose of exploitation through extortion (see A/HRC/38/45). She has also highlighted the challenges faced by refugees and migrants exploited in the course of their journeys, including a reluctance to self-report exploitation and the de-prioritization of identification efforts by relevant stakeholders.

21. The Security Council requested me to ensure that the thematic paper on countering trafficking in persons in conflict situations, prepared by UNODC, was disseminated within the United Nations system. On 17 October 2018, my office disseminated the thematic paper to all missions, as well as to the funds, programmes and agencies operating in conflict-affected settings for which the thematic paper was most relevant. They were encouraged to use it as a basis for developing tools, good practices and guidance on addressing trafficking in persons within their respective mandates. I also welcome the study prepared by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate aimed at identifying and exploring the nexus between human trafficking, acts of terrorism and terrorism financing.

III. Measures reported by Member States

A. Ratification and implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Trafficking in Persons Protocol

22. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, together with its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, continues to offer a framework for States to reinforce international cooperation in criminal matters and facilitate the exchange of information relating to trafficking offences perpetrated by armed and terrorist groups. During the reporting period, the State of Palestine deposited its instrument of accession to the Protocol on 29 December 2017; the Protocol entered into force in the State of Palestine on 28 January 2018. As at 30 September 2018, there were 187 States parties to the Convention and 173 States parties to the Protocol. On 19 October 2018, at the most recent session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, held in Vienna, Member States agreed to establish a peer review mechanism to enhance the implementation of the Convention, including the Trafficking in Persons Protocol.

[3] General Assembly resolution 71/1.

[4] www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/180713_Agreed-Outcome_Global-Compact-for-Migration.pdf.

23. In their contributions to the present report, a number of States noted that there was no armed conflict in their territories and that they had not identified victims of trafficking coming from conflict-affected areas or trafficked by terrorist or armed groups. Nevertheless, the measures these States presented in their inputs related to identifying and protecting victims of trafficking remain relevant to the overall purpose of the Convention and Protocol, which is to ensure that all victims of trafficking are identified and protected, and traffickers prosecuted and convicted. I encourage them to continue such efforts, as they clearly contribute to a more comprehensive response internationally.

24. The majority of Member States had adopted legislation criminalizing trafficking in persons, in line with the Trafficking in Persons Protocol. Several States noted that their anti-trafficking laws, which covered various forms of exploitation, applied to trafficking in times of peace, as well as in times of conflict. Some States stressed that certain related conduct might be covered by provisions other than those specifically criminalizing trafficking in persons. That was the case, for instance, with regard to the recruitment of children by armed groups, which in some States had been established as a distinct criminal offence. Other States stressed that trafficking in persons constituted a violation of human rights and possibly also a war crime, a crime against humanity or even genocide.

25. One State questioned the competence of the Security Council to address trafficking in persons, arguing that trafficking fell within the purview of other United Nations bodies.

B. Implementation of applicable legal obligations to prevent, criminalize, investigate and prosecute trafficking in conflict situations

26. Many States highlighted the challenges associated with the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking in the context of armed conflict, and reported various measures that they had undertaken to address such challenges.

27. The utilization of officers with a specialization in investigating human trafficking and other complex crimes was highlighted as a key objective and good practice. Similarly, several States reported efforts to provide adequate training in combating trafficking in persons, in all its manifestations, to criminal justice actors and consular staff, including through specialized courses throughout their training curricula.

28. States continued to report successful initiatives to enhance information exchange and joint operations relating to trafficking cases. I welcome the setting up of a joint investigation team involving France, the Niger and Spain to fight against criminal networks linked to trafficking in persons, and invite other States to join or support similar initiatives. Other positive developments include the conduct of regionally coordinated investigations and the conclusion of memorandums of understanding and agreements between countries of origin, transit and destination of specific trafficking flows.

29. Measures targeting the capacity of international peacekeepers in active duty or when stationed in areas affected by armed conflict are particularly crucial in addressing trafficking in such areas. States reported the integration of specialized training on trafficking in persons, the criminal structures involved and their modi operandi as part of regular predeployment training. Another good practice that was noted concerned the issuance of guidelines for the identification and referral of trafficking victims to competent authorities, and for the utilization of these guidelines

by military police officers deployed on the ground and tasked with investigating offences committed by troops. I invite States to follow these approaches and continue to enhance the training of military and police personnel to provide them with skills to address human trafficking in conflict and post-conflict situations.

30. Some States indicated that they had established jurisdiction over trafficking offences committed outside of their territory in accordance with article 15 of the Organized Crime Convention. I am pleased to note that other States reported the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction without a requirement of dual criminality. For instance, one State reported that its anti-trafficking law had an extraterritorial reach, which provided jurisdiction over its nationals, who might be prosecuted for trafficking offences committed abroad, including in areas affected by armed conflict. I invite Member States to consider these approaches, which facilitate international cooperation and curtail impunity.

31. Prevention of trafficking in persons is also key, especially considering that vulnerability increases in areas affected by conflict or hosting persons fleeing conflict. Joint efforts between government agencies and civil society organizations constitute a good method of sensitizing and raising awareness about human trafficking among internally displaced persons, as well as other persons involved. A State directly affected by internal armed conflict reported the establishment of a specialized State entity, which developed advocacy materials and organized specialized training for frontline officers assisting children in situations of armed conflict. I invite States to pursue such efforts and extend them to other settings and audiences, such as refugee camps and reception centres.

32. A number of States reported the establishment of national strategies and action plans. Many national action plans foresaw a comprehensive approach, encompassing the prevention of trafficking, the protection of victims and the prosecution of perpetrators. Some expressly referred to trafficking related to armed conflict. One State, for instance, reported that its national action plan included targets that specifically took into consideration the circumstances in areas affected by armed conflict, such as research on trafficking in zones of armed conflict and the development of specific prevention programmes, community educational activities and campaigns.

33. I welcome the development by several States of a multidimensional approach that includes the incorporation of information on the risks of trafficking in persons into school curricula and training programmes. National educational institutions have integrated information on this issue into class materials, as well as information on children who are vulnerable as a result of armed conflict, and held discussion sessions at all levels of education. I invite States to further continue these efforts and to consider integrating the topic of trafficking in persons into the teaching modules of educational institutions.

C. Improving the identification of victims or persons vulnerable to trafficking, including by enhancing the capacity of professionals interacting with persons forcibly displaced by armed conflict

34. Many States underlined early identification as a crucial measure for the provision of adequate protection to victims of trafficking, including victims in areas affected by conflicts or coming from such areas. Several States, especially those facing mixed migration flows as transit or destination countries, reported advancing significant efforts to that end.

35. Several States reported the development of inclusive identification regimes, which enhanced the capabilities of public and private professionals to detect and identify victims or persons vulnerable to trafficking as early as possible. The involvement of a broad range of professionals in the process for screening, identification and registration of refugees and migrants was particularly prevalent in hotspots, first reception centres, accommodation centres and shelters for asylum seekers and migrants. Those included asylum profes ˙onals, border guards, labour inspectors, health professionals (including mental health practitioners and paramedics) and the authorities of local administrations. Collaboration with civil society organizations in identification efforts has also been reported, notably in the setting up of mobile teams and in the development of international training programmes. I invite States to support such activities, which directly contribute to the development of early-screening frameworks critical to assisting, supporting and protecting victims in a timely manner.

36. States stressed that the involvement of a broader group of stakeholders was best accompanied by the development of specific training courses, booklets and guidelines. I welcome the fact that States have developed training courses addressing the identification of trafficking victims among foreign citizens and stateless persons and the need for trauma-informed interviewing techniques for vulnerable persons coming from conflict zones. One State reported the adoption of an inter-institutional training plan with a mandatory training requirement for all professionals at local, central and regional authorities. Other States had developed unified vulnerability assessments that were carried out by medical doctors and psychosocial professionals and produced booklets for migration and asylum authorities providing a comprehensive overview of trafficking, as well as standard operating procedures for the identification and referral of victims of trafficking, including specific provisions for unaccompanied minors. Some States also provided specialized assistance and shelters for victims of trafficking identified among refugees and reported rehabilitation programmes for victims in areas affected by conflict and camps for internally displaced persons, such as vocational training, in dedicated skill acquisition centres. I encourage States to adopt and support similar approaches that contribute to the identification of, and the provision of assistance and support to, trafficking victims.

37. Unaccompanied children forcibly displaced by armed conflict are particularly vulnerable to traffickers and to being recruited for combat. I am pleased to highlight that, in addition to criminalizing the forced recruitment of children in hostilities, many States have implemented specific activities to identify such children and rehabilitate them. With regard to the general protection of children, many States reported specific measures to identify vulnerable children, ensure their timely registration and consider their particular protection needs. It was noted that child victims of, or children vulnerable to, trafficking received protection and assistance from relevant government agencies in camps hosting internally displaced persons. States reported that national authorities arranged for the hosting of unaccompanied or separated children by foster families within the refugee community to reduce isolation. To ensure the protection of such children, other States provided for the appointment of guardians to cater for the needs of children and address whether they had been victims of trafficking, as well as for the placement of children in foster care

rather than in detention. The use of foster care is in line with recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.[5]

38. Non-punishment of victims of trafficking for offences committed during their trafficking experience remains closely connected to their prompt identification, with a number of States noting that their domestic legislation provided for the exoneration of such persons from criminal liability in specific circumstances, including when persons were prosecuted for infringement of migration law. The principle of non-punishment is also particularly relevant when persons are released from the captivity of armed and terrorist groups.

D. Strengthening compliance with international standards on combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism

39. States continued their efforts to disrupt human trafficking activities through the conduct of financial investigations and the analysis of financial flows associated with human trafficking. At the same time, however, information on trafficking in persons to finance terrorism remains limited.

40. States have reported on the development of the capabilities of their financial intelligence units and their work in conducting financial investigations in cases of human trafficking. In some cases, these activities led to the recovery of several million dollars. Some States stressed in that regard the usefulness of innovative approaches, such as training offered by providers of financial transfer services to criminal justice practitioners. Collaboration between State authorities and money-service providers also proved useful by increasing awareness and detection of trafficking-related suspicious transaction reports. In addition, the fruitful collaboration between States, the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering led to the publication in July 2018 of an updated report on financial flows from human trafficking,[6] which focused on the laundering of proceeds of human trafficking. I invite States to take into account the risk indicators and the good practices mentioned in that report, which contribute to reinforcing the efficiency of systems in detecting and combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism from human trafficking.

41. Regarding cooperation and partnerships for the disruption of financial activity and flows associated with trafficking, States reported various regional and multi-stakeholder initiatives, involving experts from the financial sector, law enforcement officers and financial intelligence units. These initiatives are essential to analyse trends and share information on methods used to launder the proceeds of human trafficking. Some regional initiatives go beyond training and the sharing of information to include the carrying out of joint investigations to dismantle the financial business models of criminals.

[5] See UNHCR, Division of International Protection, "UNHCR's position regarding the detention of refugee and migrant children in the migration context" (January 2017), available at www.refworld.org/pdfid/5885c2434.pdf; and UNHCR, "Beyond detention: a global strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees (2014–2019)", revision 1 (Geneva, 2014), available at www.unhcr.org/53aa929f6.pdf.

[6] Financial Action Task Force and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, *Financial Flows from Human Trafficking* (Paris, 2018). Available at www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Human-Trafficking-2018.pdf.

IV. Response of the United Nations system and other international and regional bodies

A. Support provided by United Nations entities to Member States to prevent and respond to trafficking in persons in conflict situations

42. The United Nations system has continued to provide support to Member States to prevent and respond to trafficking in persons in conflict situations. UNODC is working with national authorities to assist them in implementing the Trafficking in Persons Protocol. UNODC provides joint training sessions for investigators and prosecutors, integrating specific modules on trafficking in persons into the curricula of national training institutes, and develops standard operating procedures for investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons offences. These constitute good practices for increasing the capacities of criminal justice practitioners. Moreover, the assistance provided by UNODC to States in building databases to collect and analyse data on trafficking in persons also serves to help practitioners design effective policies to counter trafficking.

43. Support provided by UNODC to counter human trafficking in relation to armed conflict includes: technical round tables in territories where armed groups are operating, to strengthen capacities in the identification of and response to risk factors related to trafficking in persons; legislative assistance to incorporate the Trafficking in Persons Protocol into national law in countries affected by conflict; training workshops for criminal justice officers on the nexus between terrorism and human trafficking, with specific regard paid to the investigation and prosecution of cases of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict; provision of support for the deployment of liaison magistrates from origin countries to destination countries, to facilitate international judicial cooperation in criminal matters; capacity-building activities to address the phenomenon of children associated with terrorist groups; and a regional workshop for countries in East Africa on children on the move recruited and exploited by armed and terrorist groups.

44. Moreover, UNODC, in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has developed a training module on trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants for the in-mission training of police personnel deployed in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The module will be used to deliver a training-of-trainers session to MINUSMA police officers. The latter will subsequently roll out the training to their peers.

45. UNODC, in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and in consultation with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, is implementing capacity-building activities to integrate a gender lens into criminal justice responses to terrorism, including in cases of trafficking in persons to finance terrorism. Such cooperation efforts are commendable and I encourage all entities of the United Nations system to proactively explore opportunities to join forces in addressing manifestations of human trafficking in conflict settings.

46. The United Nations voluntary trust fund for victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, managed by UNODC, selected 26 projects of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the receipt of $1.4 million in funding as part of its third grant cycle. At least half of these projects explicitly provide direct protection and assistance to victims trafficked in a situation of armed conflict or identified within mass refugee and migration movements. Humanitarian, legal and

financial aid to victims is provided to victims through existing channels of assistance, including NGO partners in various conflict-affected countries.

47. UNHCR is addressing trafficking in persons in areas affected by armed conflict in the context of the sexual and gender-based violence and child protection areas of responsibility of the Global Protection Cluster. UNHCR focuses on developing targeted information campaigns in source countries of mixed migration flows, aimed at informing people about the dangers related to specific countries affected by conflict. UNHCR is also engaged in joint capacity development for improving the identification of and provision of assistance, protection and solutions to trafficking victims at the global, regional and field levels in areas affected by armed conflict.

48. IOM continues to work in partnership with Governments, other United Nations agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and development partners on all aspects of counter-trafficking responses.

49. IOM is strengthening referral mechanisms for trafficked persons, particularly for sexual and labour exploitation, through capacity-building activities, victim identification and direct assistance in countries hosting large numbers of persons displaced by conflict. To reinforce referral mechanisms and coordination, IOM has been strengthening the roles of and cooperation between development and humanitarian stakeholders through the establishment of inter-agency counter-trafficking working groups in conflict-affected settings. IOM also conducts information campaigns targeting conflict affected-populations to raise awareness of recruitment strategies deployed by traffickers and to link them with appropriate humanitarian services.

50. The Office of Counter-Terrorism, together with OHCHR and with the support of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, is developing a human rights training module for frontline border officials which addresses the identification of possible victims of trafficking.

51. The Office of Counter-Terrorism Working Group on Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism has developed a project on mapping the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of women and girls abducted by Boko Haram. The project maps the services and mechanisms established by government and United Nations entities to support such women and girls.

52. In January 2018, the Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect organized the fourth annual symposium on the role of religion and faith-based organizations in international affairs, which examined, among other topics, human rights issues linked to forced migration, including human trafficking and the related risk of atrocity crimes in conflict situations.

53. Given the close link between grave violations against children, such as abduction, recruitment and sexual violence, and trafficking in persons, measures taken to address the six grave violations affecting children in situations of armed conflict often have a preventative effect on trafficking of children. My Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict plays a key role in the drafting, signing and implementation of action plans for government forces and armed groups aimed at ending and preventing these grave violations. Action plans also serve as tools to address the trafficking of boys and girls for specific exploitative purposes. Fourteen action plans, six with government forces and eight with armed groups, were being implemented as at August 2018.

54. Throughout 2017, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and child protection partners supported the reintegration of over 12,000 children released from armed forces and groups, which often directly benefited child victims of trafficking. The formulation of standard operating procedures for the release and handover of

children associated with armed groups has proven to be an effective response tool to ensure that affected boys and girls are handed over to child protection actors and reunified with their families or caregivers. Two Governments have signed handover protocols for children since February 2017. Similarly, in August 2017, the Chief of Defence Forces of the Somali National Army issued a general command order to enhance the application of its 2014 standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups to the United Nations. My Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict has taken a lead role in advocating for the adoption and implementation of these agreements.

55. My Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict is also playing a lead role in ensuring commitments from Governments and armed groups to address conflict-related sexual violence by signing joint communiqués and frameworks of cooperation. The most recent framework of cooperation with Bangladesh, signed in September 2018, covers the prevention of trafficking in persons. Also, the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict has been supporting the Government of Iraq in its effort to address crimes of sexual violence committed by ISIL, including those associated with human trafficking.

56. The Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, in her latest report to the General Assembly (A/73/171), addresses the gender dimension of human trafficking in conflict and post-conflict settings. The report focuses on the protection of victims and potential victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation and on the prevention of trafficking of women and girls in the aftermath of conflicts through the participation and empowerment of women. The report further explains that vulnerabilities deriving from conflicts are highly gendered, thus requiring the integration of a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach to trafficking in persons into all pillars of the women and peace and security agenda.

57. The Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, in her 2018 reports on domestic servitude of migrant women and girls and on the gender dimensions of contemporary forms of slavery, discussed armed conflict among the risk factors that can lead to situations of vulnerability and trafficking in persons.

58. In addition to the support provided by entities of the United Nations system, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is also supporting its participating States that have large migratory groups from conflict and post-conflict areas. Through its project on combating human trafficking along migration routes, OSCE assisted States in enhancing criminal justice responses and prosecution of human traffickers operating along migration routes, and in better equipping frontline operators to identify and protect potential victims. In addition, since 2017, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has carried out initiatives to develop law enforcement capacity, information sharing and identification of trafficking victims to counter the trafficking of members of vulnerable communities, including in the context of conflict, along the Sahel migration route and in North Africa.

B. Efforts to increase knowledge on financial flows associated with trafficking in persons, including those which finance terrorism

59. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, within the framework of its assessment visits conducted on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, raised awareness of human trafficking as both a tactic of terrorism and a means of raising funds for terrorist purposes.

60. The Directorate is developing a study aimed at further exploring the nexus between human trafficking, terrorism and the financing of terrorism. Preliminary information gathered by the Directorate thus far indicates that only a few States have been able to provide concrete instances pertaining to this nexus. The study will also reflect how other factors, notably armed conflict situations, forced displacements and irregular migration flows, have an impact on vulnerability to trafficking in persons.

61. As noted above, the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering issued a typology report on financial flows from human trafficking, which was adopted by the Task Force in June 2018. The report provides, inter alia, an overview of recent developments in the nature and scope of financial flows associated with human trafficking, including proceeds contributing to terrorist organizations and their activities.

62. The United Nations University and two Member States have developed a global, multi-stakeholder financial sector commission[7] to accelerate the financial sector's engagement in the fight against human trafficking, including by tackling drivers of human trafficking related to countering the financing of terrorism.

C. Integration of trafficking in persons into the work of sanctions Committees

63. The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team continued to include the issue of trafficking in persons in its discussions with Member States. In its twenty-first report to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities (S/2018/14/Rev.1), the Monitoring Team noted the patterns of human trafficking in Libya and the fact that ISIL in Libya continued to "tax" networks involved in human trafficking. In its twenty-second report to the Committee (S/2018/705), the Monitoring Team noted that it had received limited information from Member States on linkages between human trafficking and terrorist financing. In a bid to facilitate the future systematic collection of data on these issues, the Monitoring Team has encouraged its interlocutors to be alert to the opportunity to acquire such information presented by foreign terrorist fighters leaving conflict zones and entering the jurisdiction of Member States. Accordingly, I encourage Member States to provide the Monitoring Team with information that could help identify persons and entities involved in terrorist financing through trafficking in persons.

64. Relevant sanctions committees have integrated the issue of human trafficking into the implementation of sanctions measures. On 7 June 2018, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya designated six individuals as subject to sanctions measures as a result of their involvement in transnational trafficking networks in Libya. In addition, relevant sanctions committees have also considered the findings and recommendations of expert groups concerning human trafficking. Those have included, among others, the report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (S/2017/1125), the report of the Panel of Experts on Libya concerning trafficking in Libya and the surrounding region (S/2018/812) and the report of the Panel of Experts on Mali (S/2018/581), which was established in September 2017 and explicitly mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2374 (2017) to track activities related to trafficking in persons.

65. Since 2015, the Department of Political Affairs has held an annual workshop on investigative interview techniques for groups and panels of experts, including

[7] See www.financialsectorcommission.org.

humanitarian experts. In addition, during the annual inter-panel workshop held in December 2017, the Department introduced a module on women, peace and security and on sexual violence in conflict. Moreover, the Department has developed a training course to strengthen its own understanding of the nexus between conflict and transnational organized crime, including human trafficking networks.

D. Efforts to enhance transparency in the procurement and supply chains of the United Nations system organizations

66. The United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct and the United Nations General Conditions of Contract clearly articulate that any supplier providing products or services to the United Nations is expected to adhere to the values of the Charter of the United Nations and to the International Labour Standards, and that contractors shall take all appropriate measures to prevent sexual exploitation or abuse by its employees or any other person they have engaged and prohibit forced or compulsory labour in all its forms. The text in the Supplier Code of Conduct on measures addressing human trafficking will be further explored within the Procurement Network of the High-level Committee on Management.

E. Improving data collection, analysis and research

67. UNODC has pursued its work on research and analysis related to trafficking in conflict situations. In partnership with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNODC has interviewed police and justice experts from peacekeeping operations, focusing on the experiences and perceptions of the experts to identify the forms of exploitation, the profiles of victims and modi operandi. Cases from the international criminal tribunals have also been examined to identify how forced marriage, sexual slavery and recruitment of children have occurred in armed conflict, which may include aspects of trafficking in persons. The result of the research will be presented in the 2018 UNODC *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons*, which will be released in December 2018.

68. In the area of data collection and research, IOM is collecting baseline data on human trafficking and migrant exploitation, abuse and vulnerability in situations of crisis, displacement and large-scale migration. IOM continued using the Displacement Tracking Matrix to produce baseline data to inform responses aimed at countering trafficking in complex crisis situations and large-scale, cross-border migration flows.

69. The Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict helped to ensure that information collected from areas of conflict through the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence encompasses trafficking in persons, as per resolution 2388 (2017). This enabled me to address trafficking in persons in my annual report on conflict-related sexual violence, when relevant.

70. In June 2017, the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings launched a research project to study the links between human trafficking and terrorism by collecting and analysing cases of forced and deceptive recruitment, and the transfer and harbouring of adults and children for the purpose of exploitation. The research examines the vulnerability factors that are exploited by terrorist groups in order to lure individuals into conflict areas, and is aimed at refining our understanding of how persons are coerced, deceived, threatened or kidnapped into terrorist networks.

71. United Nations University has launched an online knowledge platform (Delta 8.7) that brings together data, evidence and analysis related to target 8.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The platform includes the latest research on conflict situations, organized crime and migration, and their connection to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.

F. Efforts to develop coordinated responses to trafficking in persons in conflict situations

72. I am pleased to report that United Nations entities and international and regional organizations have stepped up their coordination efforts within the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons. Since November 2017, four entities with important mandates in conflict-related areas, namely the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect and the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, joined the Group, which currently consists of 22 members and 1 partner organization. On 2 May 2018, members of the Group met for the first time at the principals level and took important strategic decisions to advance its work, including to develop guidance materials on anti-trafficking responses, increase joint advocacy efforts and establish an administrative secretariat for the Group, led by UNODC. The Group remains the main United Nations inter-agency mechanism to address human trafficking.

73. The thematic paper on countering trafficking in persons in conflict situations, prepared by UNODC following consultations with a broad range of United Nations entities, is a tool to foster more consistent and coordinated responses to human trafficking by the United Nations system. Through contributing to a common and better understanding of human trafficking in the context of conflict, it is aimed at supporting collaborative efforts to prevent and counter conflict-related human trafficking.

74. The task team on anti-trafficking in humanitarian action of the Global Protection Cluster continued to develop a common position on interventions to counter trafficking as part of humanitarian responses and to provide recommendations and guidance on how best to integrate such interventions systematically into Cluster mechanisms. Between October 2017 and June 2018, the task team carried out a stocktaking exercise in the humanitarian response mechanisms on trafficking in persons. Through semi-structured interviews with Protection Cluster Coordinators and other actors in 29 humanitarian settings, the task team assessed if and how human trafficking was being addressed by Cluster coordination mechanisms, identified gaps and recurring challenges and explored opportunities related to addressing human trafficking in the humanitarian response. The report of this exercise was released in September 2018.[8]

V. Observations and recommendations

75. During the reporting period, the international community has sustained and enhanced its efforts to respond to trafficking in persons in conflict situations. I particularly welcome the efforts undertaken by States and other stakeholders to better identify, among persons affected by conflict, those who have been trafficked, or who are at risk of being trafficked. I urge Member States to consider replicating the good

[8] Available at www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/anti-trafficking-in-humanitarian-responses.pdf.

practices mentioned in the present report, such as the competences conferred to a wide range of public and private actors to detect trafficking victims, or persons at risk, in camps hosting refugees and/or internally displaced persons, in reception centres for migrants and during asylum proceedings. I urge States to expedite the rescue of those held in captivity by terrorist groups, including women and children trafficked and/or held as sex slaves. I invite States to ensure that victims of trafficking for the purpose of sexual violence or sexual exploitation perpetrated by terrorist groups are recognized as legitimate victims of terrorism and receive reparations. I also call upon States to train peacekeeping personnel on identifying and responding to indicators of conflict-related trafficking in persons, as a mandatory component of predeployment training. United Nations system entities have also become better equipped to address the challenges posed by trafficking in persons in conflict situations. I welcome in particular increased joint action and coordination among United Nations entities and note that coordinated responses allow for the efficient leveraging of institutional strengths and multiply the impact on the ground.

76. Combating trafficking in persons requires a comprehensive response, involving all States and stakeholders, not only those directly affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations. Such a response must include mutually reinforcing efforts to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, on the one hand, and to prevent and combat trafficking in persons on the other. As highlighted in the global compact on refugees, conflict is among the root causes of large refugee situations and contributes to increasing the risk of trafficking of individuals among vulnerable populations.

77. The Trafficking in Persons Protocol and the Organized Crime Convention remain the basis for a common understanding of trafficking in persons and provide a widely accepted legal framework for enhancing cooperation between States in this area. The almost universal ratification of the Trafficking in Persons Protocol is to be welcomed and I strongly encourage Member States that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to the Protocol and its parent Convention. The effective and full implementation of international obligations remains at the core of the international response to human trafficking, and I urge Member States to redouble their efforts to criminalize all forms of trafficking in persons in their domestic legislation, provide adequate protection and assistance to trafficking victims, bring perpetrators to justice and strengthen international cooperation. I am confident that the recently established Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto will be instrumental in making progress towards fully implementing their provisions. I hereby invite States to consider making use of technical assistance and support made available by the United Nations system.

78. Victims of trafficking suffer traumatic experiences that add to those experienced in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. Trafficking victims must receive adequate protection and assistance, notably to overcome their trauma and to facilitate their reintegration and rehabilitation. In that regard, their prompt identification is essential.

79. The collection of solid and reliable evidence during investigations is of paramount importance to ending the impunity of traffickers. I encourage Member States, whenever possible, to collect, preserve and store evidence, including electronic evidence, and to cooperate among themselves and with relevant international entities such as UNODC, to strengthen their capacities with regard to evidence collection, in full respect of international human rights law and standards.

80. Trafficking in persons is perceived by perpetrators, including armed groups and terrorists, as a high-profit and low-risk criminal activity; tracing illicit profits deriving from such activity contributes to diminishing this perception and reducing the

attractiveness of the crime. I welcome the efforts undertaken by international actors, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, to improve knowledge concerning illicit financial flows associated with human trafficking, including its linkages with terrorist financing. I invite Member States to pursue their efforts to strengthen compliance with international standards related to countering money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, conduct proactive investigations to track and disrupt criminal proceeds and financial flows associated with human trafficking and reinforce regional and international operational cooperation in this field. I also invite member States to provide to the relevant sanctions committees through the Monitoring Team and other relevant groups and panels of experts, as well as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, all information they possess on individuals that may fulfil the listing criteria and on terrorist financing through trafficking in persons.

81. Trafficking in persons can amount to conflict-related sexual violence when committed in situations of conflict for the purpose of sexual violence or exploitation; as such, it is also addressed within the context of the women and peace and security agenda of the Security Council. I would therefore encourage States to design and implement results-oriented national action plans on women, peace and security which include comprehensive measures aimed at preventing and responding to trafficking in persons at the national level and allocate sufficient human and financial resources for the effective implementation of such action plans.

82. I welcome the expansion of membership in the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons to United Nations actors handling issues relating to human trafficking in conflict situations. I also note the advances the Group has made in facilitating the United Nations speaking with one voice on trafficking in persons, including through the provision of guidance for improved systemwide analysis and programming. I encourage Member States to support the secretariat functions of the Group and invite all members of the Group to build on these recent developments and continue to devote attention to the intersections between human trafficking and conflict.

83. Finally, I encourage them to use the thematic paper on countering trafficking in persons in conflict situations developed by UNODC in consultation with United Nations entities.

United Nations S/2018/1043

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 November 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 21 November from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 20 and 21 November 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. Polyanskiy
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-20271 (E) 281118 281118

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Annex to the letter dated 21 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (20 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: five in Ladhiqiyah, one in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Hama Governorate and one in Aleppo Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation: in Inkhil, Dar'a Governorate, 450 food parcels with a total weight of 1.95 tons were distributed.

In total, 1,996 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,128.11 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (21 November 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire: five in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Aleppo, one in Hama and one in Idlib.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: in Ja'far al-Mansur, Aleppo Governorate, 450 food parcels with a total weight of 1.95 tons were distributed; and at Humaymim air base, Ladhiqiyah Governorate, 90 food parcels with a total weight of 389 kilograms were distributed.

In total, 1,998 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 3,130.45 tons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations A/73/597–S/2018/1044

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 November 2018
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Seventy-third session
Agenda item 101 (k)
General and complete disarmament: implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 23 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the joint statement of Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe on "Upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention", delivered at The Hague on 20 November 2018 at the twenty-third session of the Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 101 (k), and as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-20395 (E) 301118 031218

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Annex to letter dated 23 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Joint statement on behalf of Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

Upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention

We, the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), committed to achieving the goal of freeing the world of chemical weapons, strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances.

We commend the contribution made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to freeing the world from that type of weapons of mass destruction.

We emphasize that integrity and comprehensive universality of the CWC are of critical importance for achieving the object and the purpose of the Convention and maintaining international peace and security.

We consider the inviolability of the fundamental CWC provisions, as well as the operating principles of the OPCW, its principal and executive bodies, such as the Conference of the States Parties (the CSP), the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, to be an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring further effective functioning of the OPCW as one of the most successful multilateral mechanisms in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that the decision of the Fourth Special Session of the CWC CSP of 27 June 2018 to delegate authority to the OPCW Technical Secretariat that is not provided for in the Convention, as well as the proposals by this OPCW administrative body to assume attribution functions to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons go beyond the scope of the CWC.

Such decisions and proposals which in view of the technical nature of the OPCW are of principal importance must be considered solely in line with Article XV of the Convention.

The disunity among the States Parties to the CWC due to the politicization of the problem of the use of chemical weapons significantly reduces the efficiency of our Organization's work, as it prevents us from focusing on common and genuinely pressing tasks that are set out in the Convention and have been successfully performed for many years.

In light of the above, we call on the States Parties to the CWC to cooperate with each other in a constructive manner and seek to restore the spirit of consensus in the OPCW for the sake of integrity and universality of the Convention.

United Nations S/2018/1045

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 November 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 25 November 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to convey to you the following information.

On 24 November 2018, armed terrorist groups used toxic gases to attack peaceful residential neighbourhoods in Aleppo city. The terrorists fired dozens of chlorine-filled mortars at the Khalidiyah, Hamdaniyah, Shahba', Nile Street and Jam'iyat al-Zahra' neighbourhoods of the city, causing 107 civilians, most of whom were women, children and elderly persons, to suffer from severe asphyxiation and poisoning. The attack also resulted in damage to public and private property in the targeted areas.

This act of terrorism occurred because certain States have facilitated the delivery of chemicals to armed terrorist groups, so that those groups can use them against the Syrian people and then accuse the Syrian Government of having done so. In order to accomplish that aim, scenarios that are devised in advance in the black rooms of the intelligence agencies of certain States that sponsor terrorism are acted out by the terrorists of the "White Helmets" group. The members of that group were involved in this attack because the mortars were fired from areas in which they are active, specifically the south-eastern part of Buraykat village in the Aleppo countryside.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls upon the Security Council to condemn these terrorist crimes immediately and forcefully. It also calls upon the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security by taking preventive and punitive measures immediately in respect of those regimes and States that support and fund terrorism. The Council must prevent those States and regimes from continuing to support terrorism and to undermine international peace and security, and it must compel them to implement fully the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-20419 (E) 291118 301118

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United Nations S/2018/1046

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 November 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 22 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you of yet another Iranian violation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). On 9 April 2018, Iran delivered one Khordad air defence system, developed and manufactured by the military industries of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to the T4 airbase in Syria. The system was shipped to Syria using an Iranian carrier and unloaded in the presence of senior IRGC officials.

According to our understanding, Iran's activities constitute a clear and severe violation of annex B of Security Council resolution 2231, which prohibits Iran from exporting all arms and related materials without the explicit, advance and case-by-case approval of the Council.

Israel has provided the necessary evidence regarding this violation to the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs.

The international community should not turn a blind eye to such flagrant violations.

I call upon the Security Council to remain vigilant in the light of the growing threat posed by Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East and to hold it accountable for its repeated violations of Council resolution 2231.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-20253 (E) 271118

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United Nations S/2018/1047

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 November 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 23 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Since the beginning of 2018, Iran has violated Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) continuously and through a variety of methods, including through the launching of ballistic missiles. I wish to bring to your attention information regarding nine ballistic missile tests conducted by Iran during the course of 2018:

1. In January 2018, Iran launched a Shahab-3 ballistic missile variant.
2. In January 2018, Iran launched a Scud ballistic missile variant.
3. In February 2018, Iran launched a Zolfaghar ballistic missile.
4. In April 2018, Iran launched a Khorramshahr ballistic missile.
5. In May 2018, Iran launched a Zolfaghar ballistic missile.
6. In May 2018, Iran launched a Shahab-3 ballistic missile variant.
7. In June 2018, Iran launched a Shahab-3 ballistic missile variant.
8. In August 2018, Iran launched a Qiam ballistic missile.
9. In August 2018 Iran launched a Zolfaghar ballistic missile.

All of these missile systems meet the Category I criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime, as they are capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300 kilometres. As such, they are inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Iran also conducted missile operational activities and tests during this same period that do not exceed the aforementioned threshold but that still raise serious concerns.

According to our understanding, these ballistic activities constitute clear violations of Iran's obligations under article 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231, in which the Council calls upon Iran "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons".

Israel has provided the necessary evidence regarding these violations to the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs.

Iran's ballistic activities do not occur in a vacuum but instead reflect a pillar of the regime's malicious activities throughout the Middle East, especially in Syria,

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Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and the Gaza Strip. Iran's activities pose a direct threat to Israel and to the stability of the entire region.

I call upon the Security Council to condemn Iran's repeated violations of Council resolution 2231 immediately and unequivocally.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/1048

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 November 2018

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 12 November 2018 (see annex).

18-20268 (E) 281118

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Annex

Letter dated 12 November 2018 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the document submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed document to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)*

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It also provides information on financial matters, and the Agency's consultations and exchanges of information with the Joint Commission, established by the JCPOA.

B. Background

2. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America,[1] with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA" (GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1, para. 8). In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. The Board of Governors also authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1.

3. In December 2016 and January 2017, the Director General shared with Member States nine documents,[2] developed and endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission, providing clarifications for the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related measures as set out in the JCPOA for its duration.[3]

4. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is €9.2 million per annum. For 2018, extrabudgetary funding is

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* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2018/47.

[1] On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, announced that the "United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal", "Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action', at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.

[2] Reproduced in INFCIRC/907 and INFCIRC/907/Add.1.

[3] GOV/2017/10, para. 3.

necessary for €5.1 million of the €9.2 million.[4] As of 12 November 2018, €8.2 million of extrabudgetary funding was available to meet the cost of JCPOA-related activities for 2018 and beyond.

C. JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities

5. Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA,[5] consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices, and in an impartial and objective manner.[6,7] The Agency reports the following for the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.[8]

C.1. Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing

6. Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design.[9,10] Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras. 3 and 10).[11]

7. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)[12] and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran's heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). On 3 November 2018, the Agency verified that the plant was in operation and that Iran's stock of heavy water was 122.8 metric tonnes.[13] Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).

8. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production

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[4] The cost of the provisional application of Iran's Additional Protocol (€3.0 million) and €1.1 million of the €2.2 million for the inspector costs related to the verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA are being met from the regular budget (GC(60)/2).

[5] Including the clarifications referred to in para. 3 of this report.

[6] GOV/2016/8, para. 6.

[7] Note by the Secretariat, 2016/Note 5.

[8] GOV/2018/24.

[9] The calandria was removed from the reactor and rendered inoperable during preparation for Implementation Day and has been retained in Iran (GOV/INF/2016/1, Arak heavy water research reactor, paras 3(ii) and 3(iii)).

[10] As indicated previously (GOV/2017/24, footnote 10), Iran has changed the name of the facility to the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor.

[11] The paragraph references in parentheses throughout Sections C and D of this report correspond to the paragraphs of 'Annex I — Nuclear-related measures' of the JCPOA.

[12] HWPP is a facility for the production of heavy water which, according to the design information provided by Iran to the Agency on 25 January 2016, has a nominal capacity of 16 tonnes of nuclear grade heavy water per year and an actual capacity of "about 20 tonnes" of nuclear grade heavy water per year. Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 18 June 2017, that the "maximum annual capacity of the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is 20 Tons".

[13] On 3 November 2018, the Agency confirmed that, since the Director General's previous report, 1.7 metric tonnes of heavy water had been shipped out of Iran and Iran had used 1.5 metric tonnes of heavy water for research and development (R&D) activities related to the production of deuterated compounds for medical applications. These R&D activities were conducted under continuous monitoring by the Agency.

(MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras. 18 and 21).[14]

C.2. Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel

9. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has withdrawn 33 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage[15] for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).

10. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF_6 at FEP.[16] Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28).

11. Throughout the reporting period, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF_6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.[17]

12. As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran's uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg,[18] based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.[19]

13. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46). On 6 November 2018, the Agency verified that 1020 IR-1 centrifuges were installed in six cascades. On the same date, the Agency also verified that two IR-1 centrifuges were installed in a layout of 16 IR-1 centrifuge positions[20] and one IR-1 centrifuge was installed in a single position,[21] for the purpose of conducting "initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production".[22,23]Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).

14. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).[24] The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request

[14] Including hot cells at TRR and the MIX facility and shielded cells, referred to in the decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

[15] Para. 14 of this report.

[16] Under the JCPOA, "[f]or 15 years the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D" (para. 72).

[17] Considering the standard atomic weight of uranium and fluorine.

[18] Comprising 125.4 kg of uranium in the form of UF6; 16.6 kg of uranium in the form of uranium oxides and their intermediate products; 4.3 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies and rods; and 3.1 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap.

[19] Decisions of the Joint Commission of 6 January 2016 and 18 December 2016 (INFCIRC/907), and 10 January 2017 (INFCIRC/907/Add.1).

[20] GOV/2017/48, footnote 20.

[21] On 29 January 2018, Iran provided the Agency with updated design information for FFEP, which included a temporary setup for a single IR-1 centrifuge position for "separation of stable isotopes" in Unit 2.

[22] GOV/2016/46, para. 12.

[23] On 6 November 2018, 21 IR-1 centrifuges were not installed and were stored within the facility under Agency monitoring.

[24] GOV/2016/46, footnote 15.

(para. 71). The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).

15. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).

16. On 11 November 2018, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air).

17. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of re-converting fuel plates or scrap into UF_6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).

C.3. Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory

18. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran's enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras 32–42).

19. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).

20. All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70). Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.[25,26]

D. Transparency Measures

21. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).

22. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor — through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures — that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan (para. 68). Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).

[25] Decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).
[26] GOV/2016/46, para. 18.

E. Other Relevant Information

23. Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit. Timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing such access facilitates implementation of the Additional Protocol and enhances confidence.

24. The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I of the JCPOA.

25. During this reporting period, the Agency attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV — Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

F. Summary

26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran remained ongoing.

27. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

28. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.